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PHILOSOPHICAL *PATHOS* IN MARÍA ZAMBRANO AND ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER

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Abstract

This work first analyses María Zambrano's reflections on the limits of philosophy, based on the suspicion of its vanity and the ambivalence of its origins. Zambrano explores the genealogy of the traditional conception of the origin of philosophy as wonder, a wonder that she would share with poetry. She postulates a horizon of the conjunction of philosophy and poetry, to respond to the wonder at reality, but she also refers to the possibility of rescuing a more venerable form of philosophy. Secondly the work examines whether Schopenhauer's philosophy, with its proverbial pessimism and its conception of philosophical admiration as dismay, could be regarded as an example of this venerable form of philosophy and, finally, whether aspiring to create this conjunction with poetry is still philosophy.

Keywords: history of philosophy; intuition; pessimism; poetry; *thaumazein*

1. INTRODUCTION: THE VANITY OF PHILOSOPHY

In one of her youthful letters, María Zambrano confesses to Gregorio del Campo, her boyfriend at the time, her lack of interest in science and her predilection for philosophy and art: the former only puts her in contact with ordinary life and does not arouse her curiosity, but art and philosophy illuminate and enrich life, allowing her to look into another world, adopt another perspective (Zambrano, 2012: 125). Years later, she would argue that not only philosophy and art, but also religion and science, are the creations of a being such as Man who “has an incomplete birth” and therefore cannot limit himself to living naturally: his place has to be found in the world and he is “incessantly giving birth to himself and the reality that houses him” (Zambrano, 2016a: 500). María Zambrano opted for philosophy, but it was not an uncritical adherence. Throughout her works she questions the excesses of arrogant reason born of Cartesian rationalism because it would have reduced the individual to mere consciousness and banished feelings, the body and spirituality to the dark side of reason. But in reality it would not only be about the excesses of a specific philosophical current: “to every movement rich in philosophy a voice in a serious tone, sometimes bitter, and sometimes mocking, always responds, denouncing its vanity, showing something more humble, even sordid, but indissoluble” (Zambrano, 2016a: 479). Vanity is arrogance and



presumption, but it also refers to the expiration of the things of this world; the word also means the useless or insubstantial. Vain is that which lacks entity or substance and therefore solidity and foundation. It is also fruitless. But how can 'the love of wisdom' be said to be arrogant or useless or fruitless? Is all philosophy so? Why then engage in this cultivation of vanity? As a result of these disturbing questions raised by the statements of María Zambrano, that is, by a philosopher, this work analyses: 1) What is the vanity to which the author refers. 2) What philosophy is possible once mockery and / or bitterness take the floor and from what emotional tone should philosophy be undertaken from then on. As we know, María Zambrano postulates with respect to this last question a turning or transformation of philosophy towards a poetic reason to clarify and accept the finitude of the human being, which remains in the shadows because it cannot be rationalized, that is, fully catalogued, explained and justified. This article does not address the concept of poetic reason, a subject that has been widely analysed, but rather the contribution to reflection on the humble and indissoluble from the pessimism of Arthur Schopenhauer. Between 1922 and 1924, again in a letter to Gregorio del Campo, Zambrano mentions Schopenhauer among the authors that she is reading (Moreno Sanz, 2014: 51). In her writings there is no explicit dialogue with the author and in principle it would not seem that pessimism actually helps to rationalize existence. This then is the third question that I intend to consider: 3) In what sense is the pessimism of the German philosopher a reflection on the vanity of a philosophy that, nevertheless, sustains our existence, illuminates and enriches life and allows us to adopt other perspectives and look into another world, as the young Zambrano demanded.

2. DISMANTLING PHILOSOPHICAL WONDER

2.1 A GRAVE VOICE SOMETIMES BITTER AND SOMETIMES MOCKING

The grave voice, sometimes bitter and sometimes mocking, that accuses every great philosophical proposal of vanity is “the nakedness of man”, everything that surrounds his complete finitude, without ornament or false illusions. Finiteness cannot be hidden or made invisible, it cannot be dissolved and even less overcome, and it always emerges as if in rebellion, forcing a philosophical system to show its credentials and test its results, putting it on the ropes in both aspects. Zambrano, without any pretense of outlining a history of philosophy according to these rebellious voices, does mention some examples: Thomas de Kempis would respond to Thomas Aquinas, Epictetus to Aristotle, or Kierkegaard to Hegel. She does not refer to mocking voices, but they could be cited, also only by way of example: Lucian of Samosata, Erasmus, Montaigne or Nietzsche, who is very present in the work of Zambrano.

Lucian of Samosata, whom Erasmus translates and appreciates, as do other contemporaries (Marsh, 1988) derides philosophers because they are either impostors or they betray their science. They are theorists and experts in words and they do not practice what they preach (Lucian of Samosata, 2002: 17), although facts and actions are the only thing that every sensible man can trust (Lucian of Samosata, 2002: 18). In *The Fugitives*, Philosophy itself complains about its impersonators, although the reader can clearly see that on many occasions they are only taking themselves seriously and putting into practice the absurd or impossible proposals of the science they serve (Lucian of Samosata, 2002e: 210). In *The fisherman* Parresiades does not hide his disappointment: these hypocrites of philosophers use their knowledge as a trade, not as a vocation and a compass for life, and they are sycophants of the rich (Lucian of Samosata, 2002c: 78) or satellites of these, as we hear in *Philosophy of Nigrinus* (Lucian of Samosata, 2002a: 41). The *Auction of Lives*, nothing less than philosophical lives are put out to tender, but there is no way to sell them: they are unviable, useless or even repulsive, like the one proposed by Diogenes to a potential buyer who, after hearing it, angrily dispatches him with: “Get out. You say foul things unfit for a man” (Lucian of de Samosata, 2002b: 38).

The last philosopher up for auction is Pyrrho who proclaims as the culmination of his doctrine “ignorance and not hearing or seeing (...) being indecisive, insensitive and not differing in anything from a worm” (Lucian of Samosata, 2002b: 52). These characteristics are only of interest to someone who merely wants a slave, and so the buyer states “precisely for that reason you are worth buying” (Lucian of Samosata, 2002b: 52). Philosophers also pride themselves on being able to lead man to truth and happiness, but philosophy has never performed such wonders, as Licinus explains to Hermitimus. This unhappy man has already wasted at least twenty years devoting body and soul to his study and is on the verge of losing his health (Lucian of Samosata, 2002f: 26, 84).

Menippus, faced with the evidence that there are as many philosophies as there are philosophers, that they can defend anything, that they do not practice what they preach and that, despite their excellent science, they exhibit the weaknesses and vices of any neighbour's son, concludes that philosophy is something useless so he goes to Hades to find the truth from the wise Tiresias. This is the first thing Tiresias advises him to do: forget about philosophy and simply "live the present in a good way, laughing at most things and not taking anything seriously" (Lucian of Samosata, 2002d: 255).

Folly, as portrayed by Erasmus, mocks the grandiosity of the philosophers and their affectation. They behave like walking oracles yet all they know is verbal terms and subtleties (Erasmus, 2011: 86, 125). Among philosophers it is not to be expected to find men of action or useful citizens. They underestimate human nature by always harassing man to renounce what he is, as if it were a misfortune "to be faithful to one's own species" (Erasmus, 2011: 86). They are blind to their own follies and do not seem to understand that follies are what preserve society, lighten our existence and make human relationships bearable. Philosophers insist on imposing reason, but not on guiding the human being in the comedy of life (Erasmus, 2011: 76, 80). They do not take into account that "removing the illusion is to ruin the drama" and that you cannot live without some balm (Erasmus, 2011: 79).

The unintended and fortuitous philosopher referred to by Montaigne would have preferred to portray himself naked and aspires to paint not the being but the moment (Montaigne, 2006: 787). We are condemned to develop relative and provisional knowledge, only useful according to the individuals and circumstances. It is dogmatic, but also madness, to believe that reason captures reality, defines our nature with its fixed concepts and can guide us with absolute judgments and values: everything mortal is constantly flowing and revolving. Nor is there any science that can free us from suffering the life that corresponds to us as mortals; in any case, it increases our sensitivity to evils. The common man seems to have more resources for living than the speculative sage.

Montaigne is absolutely graphic when he summons man to finally inhabit his being, to seek the measure of his wisdom and not to forget what, whether he wants it or not, is his most palpable foundation: "It is absolute perfection and as divine to know how to loyally enjoy one's own being. We look for another condition because we do not know how to use ours, and we go out of ourselves because we do not know how to be inside (...) Even on stilts we have to walk with our own legs. And on the highest throne in the world we continue to sit on our buttocks" (Montaigne, 2006: 1057).

The Nietzschean hammer collapsed values and ideals, including the truth: "What, then, is truth? An army of metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms in motion, (...) a sum of human relationships that have been enhanced, extrapolated, poetically and rhetorically adorned and that, after prolonged use, seem to the people to be fixed, canonical, obligatory: the truths are illusions that have forgotten that is what they are, metaphors that have been worn out and without evident force" (Nietzsche, 2016: 623). Nor did he leave standing the idiosyncrasies of the philosophers whom he accuses of being idol worshippers, of filling existence with their fictions, of not wanting to know anything about the genealogy of their dead structures (Nietzsche, 2016c: 630).

In their own way, they have also falsified life for fear of the depth that lies behind it, hence their taste for supposedly pure forms (Nietzsche, 2016b: 336). Whoever, like the 'free spirit', decides to see clearly what he is, without ceremony, has also to be willing to dissect his characteristics as a thinker and test the scope of his criticism and liberation: "Do not remain united with any person: although he is the most loved, each person is a prison, also a corner. Nor be united to any country: even if it is the one that suffers the most and the most in need (...) Nor be united to any compassion (...). Nor be united to any science: even if it attracts us with the most precious discoveries (...) Nor be united to our own detachment (...). Not be united to any of our virtues or become, as a totality, the victim of any of our individualities" (Nietzsche, 2016b: 325). It is true that Nietzsche qualifies: these tests "we carry out in front of ourselves as witnesses and before no other judge" (Nietzsche, 2016b: 325).

Therefore, if philosophy does not reach the truth or offer happiness, if it proposes the impossible, if the philosopher only manages to be another ordinary man and is also incapable of practicing what he preaches, it is certainly not *episteme* but neither is it 'love of wisdom', unless that is destruction or vanity or deceit. The philosopher is a specialist in radical criticism, but it is a different thing to live with the consequences: that is, without one's feet on the ground, emotionally dry and dehumanized.

2.2. IN THE BEGINNING THERE WAS *PATHOS*

Nietzsche affirms that the 'mother of philosophy' is not a drive for knowledge but arises from the basic drives of human beings, which have all created philosophy at some point, so there is nothing pure or impersonal in the philosopher, and that in all philosophy without exception "there comes a point where the «conviction» of the philosopher enters the scene" (Nietzsche, 2016b: 301). María Zambrano perhaps goes further because she directly poses a genealogy of philosophical wonder (*thaumazein*). This is above all a state of mind (*pathos*) that is possible because the philosopher is someone with a new creed: a radical faith in reason that sets 'maximum wonder' in motion, thus turning it into enthusiasm (Zambrano, 2019: 99). That is why philosophy is a knowledge mediating from a new ignorance: "it is a delusion, an inspiration, an irrepressible possession, Plato tells us. A passion (...). An obedience" (Zambrano, 2019a: 445). The philosopher is the one who leaves everything and looks elsewhere for a being for himself and for things. This entails a new way of seeing oneself and seeing reality, ambitious and arrogant, which involves violence and self-violence, as Plato shows in the allegory of the cave and in the ideal city (515c-d; 515e; 515e-516a; 517d-e; 517a; 519c-d; 520b). Unity is "the causal magnet for philosophical violence" because it gives things existence by participating in them. The philosopher tries first to protect himself from appearances, to save himself, and then to save these, but resolving them and forcing them to be coherent with the invisible unity. In philosophy there is also desertion and abandonment: the philosopher uproots himself "from everything received" (Zambrano, 2019a: 442), also from his own being, and "frees himself from things" (Zambrano, 2015a: 689). The initial fascination, which should seduce him to want to remain eternally within what is given, is betrayed and things turn out to be a "pretext" (Zambrano, 2015a: 689). Hence, philosophy is "an ecstasy failed by a tearing apart" (Zambrano, 2015a: 689). Only by ceasing to see are system and abstraction made possible. The ideality that abstraction implies supposes a counterintuitive vision: the stunned philosopher flees from things. As for the system, it is the form of anguish and the power of someone desperate who tries to save himself by constructing. Thought is not contemplation here but the action of someone who has nothing else "to hold on to" (Zambrano, 2015a: 748). Anguish is the root of the flight par excellence in philosophy: metaphysics (Zambrano, 2015a: 747). The result, then, is that the philosopher renounces the gift of the immediate, does not do justice to things and fails to understand his own mortality.

Meanwhile, the other great figure of wonder, the poet, wants to stay entangled in things and in what they freely offer and he experiments with his senses. He listens to his inner world and erases the borders with the external (Zambrano, 2015a: 691). But for the philosopher the limits and hierarchies have to be increasingly clear (Zambrano, 2015a: 691). The poet chooses to live in appearance, in heterogeneity, "lives dispersed" (Zambrano, 2015a: 692). It is true that he also has "his flight" and "his unity and his other world" (Zambrano, 2015a: 692) because he depends on language and every word already supposes moving away from reality and a certain liberation of the speaker and "some kind of unity" (Zambrano, 2015a: 692). But according to María Zambrano, the poet achieves a unity that is present through the poem and his words, and expresses "the most tenuous, the most winged, the most different of each thing, of each moment" (Zambrano, 2015a: 694). On the other hand, the high flights of the philosopher do not end in triumph. They do not reach all individuals, unlike poetry (Zambrano, 2015a: 695). The philosopher dedicates his life to designing a world according to his reason for having to live in one "without reason and without measure" (Zambrano, 2016: 191). And it is poetry that reappears at critical moments because it is that which has the power to suggest truths that cannot be demonstrated (Zambrano, 2015a: 692).

And yet there is a need for both philosophy and poetry, because the human being does not only feel attached to things, but also rapt and deified, and in need of clarity. According to Zambrano, a horizon would be necessary to resolve the conflict (Zambrano, 2015a: 688; 728) but not through a reform of reason, nor by simply claiming immediacy, but through an integral reason: "capable of facing the irrational depth of the real, of *the other*, as the author called it, of that primal experience based on the intuition that occurs outside the discursive *logos*" (Gómez Blesa, 2018: 60). As the author points out in the letter to Rafael Dieste of November 1944: "something that is reason, but broader (...) Poetic reason... is what I have been looking for" (Gómez Blesa, 2018: 61). In this, the metaphor and the symbol replace the concept to "collect the immediate experience of the intuited reality" (Gómez Blesa, 2018: 61).

3. A PHILOSOPHY OF MISERY TO SUSTAIN THE WORLD?

3.1. THE DETERMINATION OF SISYPHUS

We have not yet considered the other extreme tonality of the deep voice that Zambrano refers to: the bitter voice that she knew from a very young age from reading Schopenhauer, who does not stop cultivating his ridicule precisely with respect to those who he did not consider authentic philosophers, either for profiting from philosophy, which for him can only be a vocation and not a way to earn a living, or for confusing thinking and expressing oneself with our own voice with repeating the speech of others and inventing words. Schopenhauer shares themes with María Zambrano such as the irrational basis of existence and with it of our being, the enigma that constitutes existence, interest in mysticism, the value of literature and art in general, to name just a few. Here we focus only on the task of the philosopher and the origin of philosophy. For Schopenhauer, philosophical wonder is dismay at the existence of suffering and death.

The first and authentic knowledge occurs in intuition. Genius and wisdom depend on intuition too. Thanks to intuition we capture new relationships between things, that is, we increase knowledge (Schopenhauer, 2003: 102, 105). Empirical intuition is sensitive and intellectual: “pure knowledge of the cause from the effect on the part of intellect” (Schopenhauer, 2004: 61). Intuition depends on the intellect; the concepts on reason. The task of the philosopher is to pour into concepts an intuitive perception of the world that has shaken it (Schopenhauer, 2006: 186). The concept makes this knowledge of the instant communicable and capable of being applied and avoids its loss (Schopenhauer, 2004: 103, 105). The philosopher does with the concept what the artist does with a work of art (Schopenhauer, 2003: 333): “reproduce what is captured through a reflective art and «fix in true thoughts what is suspended in the fluctuating phenomenon» (Goethe, *Faust I*)” (Schopenhauer, 2004: 240). Writing and discourse, as well as philosophy, attempt “to bring the reader to the same intuitive knowledge from which its author began” (Schopenhauer, 2003: 102). The important thing, then, is intuition. However, German idealism would invite us to explain words with words, to a certain indolence of the intellect: thinking would be to accumulate concepts and thus reduce this activity to lower faculties (Xhignesse, 2020: 102). The greater the abstraction, the less perception there is in its content, the more distance from it, the epistemic base being weaker (Xhignesse, 2020: 103). Through uncontrolled abstraction, a totally different world is created from the one to which the building material was supplied: a world of chimeras (Schopenhauer, 2003: 115).

The problem with intuition is that it cannot be preserved or transmitted except through substitutes. What can be transmitted is what the brain knows, not reality. If it is abstract, it is transmitted through concepts and words, if it is intuitive, it is necessary to resort to artifice (Schopenhauer, 2003: 225). Concepts “no matter how finely they are divided with proximate determinations, are always incapable of achieving the subtle modifications of the intuitive (...) intuition always remains its asymptote” (Schopenhauer, 2004: 107). Intuition itself does not perfectly fulfill what it promises since what it offers necessarily depends ultimately on what our brain can capture and interpret. We call that knowledge. The poet and the philosopher, especially the former, try to enrich the concepts: he combines them “in such a way that their spheres intersect without any of them being able to remain in their abstract generality but instead being substituted in fantasy by an intuitive representative”. To limit generality, the poet uses epithets (Schopenhauer, 2004: 298).

According to the above, we cannot deny that philosophy aspires to collect the world. It does not attempt to run away from it. It aspires to collect the moment. However, Schopenhauer, with his gloomy meditations on human nature, society, death, suffering, crowned all of this with “blind desire, an impulse completely without foundation or motive” that is Will or the depth of the real (Schopenhauer, 2003: 403), and then with his thesis on the denial of the will, it does not seem that he ends up offering us a philosophy to sustain the world, but rather to flee from it. In fact, he has gone down in the history of philosophy as a pessimistic philosopher who proposes a kind of conversion and denial of the world. Pessimistic authors are often viewed as dissidents whose criticisms are appreciated, but they are not considered to be offering an alternative or to guide us in life (Dienstag, 2006: 3). And it is common to consider pessimism as closely related to cynicism, nihilism, despair or melancholy (Acquisto, 2021: 8). In any case, pessimism is considered the opposite of optimism, and our culture falls down on the side of optimism, as it implies

hope and progress. However, pessimism proposes “an adjustment of expectations based on the observed reality with which one is confronted, a mindset that allows one to cope with a situation rather than aspiring to something else, and crafting a livable reality from the situation by recasting the way in which one conceives it” (Acquisto, 2021: 8-9). It is not a mere affective state but an interpretation of the world that helps us to live in it, focusing, for example, on managing suffering and alleviating it when possible; in finding points of union between people; in paying attention to the meaning of life and in cultivating it (Acquisto, 2021: 10, 16).

In Schopenhauer’s case, it is only after the 1870s that he is associated exclusively with pessimism; before that it had been with atheism and with Kantian philosophy (Acquisto, 2021: 93). The author himself did not use the term ‘pessimism’ until the second edition of *The World as Will and Representation*, that is, in 1844, in the chapter “On metaphysical necessity” and at the end of the text “On the theory of the negation of the Will”. In both cases the context is religion (Janaway, 1999: 319). On the other hand, since the end of the 20th century there has been a change regarding the interpretation of his philosophy: descriptive rather than normative (Lemanski, 2020: 3). The normative interpretation assumes that Schopenhauer’s philosophy is linear and implies a soteriological purpose of conversion and redemption. Descriptive interpretation came about in the Weigelt-Becker controversy that began in 1854. Becker argued that Schopenhauer did not intend to recommend asceticism or the denial of the will, but rather to describe the world and offer options, as Frauenstädt had already argued and Schopenhauer himself recognized (Lemanski, 2012: 159). But the normative and linear reading was continued by Eduard von Hartmann, Philipp Mainländer, and Nietzsche. Paul Deussen introduced it to academic philosophy.

Apart from the use of the term ‘pessimism’, Schopenhauer points out different options for life. Only the ascetic renounces the world. Neither the compassionate man nor the artist flee from it. The first, through compassion (justice and charity), rather repairs it, he reduces suffering and therefore experiences a certain joviality and equanimity (Schopenhauer, 2004: 435), as do the mystic and the artist. They are reconciled with the world through an intuition that is not empirical, but rather has dispensed with the “principle of sufficient reason”. What is put into play is another form of consciousness, of action and even affective tonality, thanks to a certain idealism or distance: “considering things independently of the principle of reason” as opposed to everyday experience and science (Schopenhauer, 2004: 239). With this, they only escape from an interested consideration of reality, biased, fragmentary, dependent on the perspective of the subject who only sees objects at his disposal and refers everything to himself. But there are also individuals who, fully aware of what the world and existence are like, having meditated thoroughly on its most terrible side, affirm life as it is (Schopenhauer, 2004: 340). Schopenhauer also offers a collection of maxims in his latest work, *Parerga y paralipomena*, to promote an art of being the least unhappy in this world. And he maintains that we lose heaven and earth if we settle into continuous complaint and lament. Among other things, resignation is needed in this life, but not as an end, but to “regain courage” (Schopenhauer, 2004: 459). Nor does he identify *a universal feeling* that describes our state of mind in the world, since the same event will have a meaning depending on who captures it, their character traits and their faculties (Schopenhauer, 2006: 334). With regard to philosophy, it must always be theoretical, it must “investigate, not prescribe” (Schopenhauer, 2004: 327). And there is no doubt in his case: “My purpose can only be to describe both [affirmation and denial of will] and bring them to a clear knowledge of reason, not to prescribe or recommend one or the other” (Schopenhauer, 2004: 342).

The double consideration of the world as will and representation constitutes an interpretation based on the articulation, through an analogy, of the only thing that is given to us: the experience of reality as a set of phenomena and the experience of our interiority as desire and spontaneity (Schopenhauer, 2003: 699). At the time of the author it was also hoped to find an absolute book that would contain the whole world and that would guide human beings, once the Bible could no longer be such a text. Schopenhauer’s work would be one of the possible answers in this search (Lemanski, 2012: 170). This is a metaphysical description that may be enough to respond to the need for meaning: to accept a double perspective of reality, to consider ourselves will and representation, that is, to think of ourselves as part of reality, but of the same essence as the whole. Wonder is not betrayed. Here there is neither a residue or a religious nostalgia, as Nietzsche claims (Nietzsche, 2017: 132), but an intuitive and ancestral metaphysics of humanity, shared by philosophies and religions and very close on the other hand to a more common consideration: accepting that we are part of the very cycle of nature and living accordingly.

3.2. EMPATHY AND THE PROVIDENCE OF SATAN

Until now we have pointed out that poetry is an original form of ecstasy and of relationship with the world, apparently opposite and superior to the philosophical one, but María Zambrano affirms something of vital importance regarding the first: “we know that it was called poetry and who knows if some other name was erased?” (Zambrano, 2015a: 690). She also tells us that one of those names could be religion, since this is: “to base life on deep, dark, irrational foundations, depths, superior to all reason” (Zambrano, 2015: 90). Poetry has been more sensitive to that depth or root of existence and has not broken the connection of things with it, but it is not the only possibility. What matters is recovering that lost art and knowing how to deal with that depth. That is why she also affirms that it is essential to determine the part of religion that there is in each philosophy and to rescue other ways of treating reality (Zambrano, 2014: 482). Piety would be “the primarily accessible form of the religious, the making of contact, indefinable (...). And this ineffable is, however, the foundation of the word, that there are things and names for things, since it rather resembles a space, a vital space where we live, move and become” (Zambrano, 2003: 52). “Piety is action because it is feeling, feeling” the other “as it is without schematizing it in an abstraction” (Zambrano, 2020: 255).

Although poetic reason seems to Zambrano to be the one in charge of cultivating the *religion* lost with that background, it would be necessary to address that *religious* root in philosophy. Moreover, there would be a *different* type of philosophy “-the most venerable- referring to the totality of things, not to get rid of them, but to affirm them; not to escape the world, but to sustain it” (Zambrano, 2015a: 768). This ‘sustaining the world’ has nothing to do with the subject of rationalism: “Thinking, inventing the very foundations of life, not wanting anything given (...)! To support himself -the man, poor cane who thinks-, and on his shoulders, the world” (Zambrano, 2015: 78). What we are dealing with is the affirmation of life that Zambrano finds in Nietzsche, but she does not consider that this affirmation is only to be found in Nietzsche’s philosophy but in the venerable philosophy too (Zambrano, 2015: 75). Nietzsche refers - before men of pure knowledge or of “immaculate contemplation” - to the immaculate understanding of all things proper to “those who are happy to become”: “not wanting anything from things except to lie before them as a mirror with one hundred eyes” (Nietzsche, 2016a: 145). ‘Lying with things’ like a mirror is what Zambrano points to as the reality of things without the manipulation that operates in them and in oneself, the subject who knows: to place oneself in “something previous in which they leave us their reality, in which the reality of things is given to us at the same time as mine” (Zambrano, 2015b: 60-61). A reminder of the form of consciousness that the mystic reaches. However, our author indicates *something more* with ‘sustain’. It must be remembered that the poet does not want the whole of the philosopher because “he fears that in this whole there is not in effect each one of the things and their nuances; the poet wants one, each one of the things, without restrictions, without any abstraction or renunciation” (Zambrano, 2015a: 694). Poetic reality “is not only what there is, what it is; but also what is not; it encompasses being and not being (...) because everything has the right to be, even what has never been able to be. The poet draws from the humiliation of not being what groans in him; it draws nothing itself out of nothing and gives it a name and a face. The poet does not strive so that things exist, some are, and others do not reach this privilege, but rather works so that everything that is and what is not, reaches its fullness (Zambrano, 2015a: 696). The main question, then, is not to be a mere mirror, to lie before things, to let them be, or to achieve peace with them or between them. Neither is it restoring the world prior to the gaze of man. ‘Sustain’ means for Zambrano and for that most venerable philosophy that she mentions: *maintain and give encouragement and help without distinction*. Hence the great importance of the scene she takes from Louis Massignon as her opening motto for *Philosophy and Poetry*. It must be emphasized that Zambrano does not resort here to a concept or an argument, but to a powerful image to express the philosopher’s task: a disciple of the great Sufi of the 9th century, Hallaj, intrigued by a sound in a street of Baghdad asks the teacher about it. Hallaj responds that it is the voice of Satan that cries over the world: “he wants to make it survive the destruction; he cries for the things that happen; he wants to revive them, yet they fall and only God remains. Satan has been condemned to fall in love with the things that happen and for that reason he cries” (Zambrano, 2015a: 679). Louis Massignon’s text, “The methods of artistic realization in Islam”, was published in the *Revista de Occidente* in 1932. María Zambrano read it in December 1933 (Moreno Sanz, 2014: 57). In the shortened version of *Hallaj’s Passion. Mystical*

martyr of Islam is collected as a story by one of his former disciples, perhaps al-Qasri, relating it to ibn al-Azraq. The sound of the flute played by Iblis “made people cry with emotion”. And Hallaj's response is: “It is Iblis who mourns the loss of this world” (Massignon, 1999: 235). If a horizon is needed where the disposition of the poet and the philosopher are given, as Zambrano claims, it would be necessary to imitate this unknown Satan who operates with extreme care and love for all things. Wanting to revive the things that happen, trying to avoid their inexorable shipwreck, Satan carries out the most authentic and complete providence: because he wants to save everything and does not exclude anything from creation, because he suffers with all things and because he accompanies them to their end. There is an *extreme form of ontological care* that is only possible with *affective identification*. Aid is given to what is irretrievably condemned to be, no longer rubble or dust, but nothing, something *vain*. This would be the extreme and noblest form of vanity. Creation in philosophy is another way of cultivating failure and even stubbornness in a futile effort.

4. CONCLUSIONS

The origin of philosophy unfolds in a complex, ambiguous and shared *pathos* that has little to do with the purity, rigor and truth with which philosophical activity and the discipline itself are traditionally presented. Paradoxically, it is through self-imposed and ascetic violence that the sophistication and growth of subjectivity, the creation of other worlds and perspectives and even protective resources in the face of a hostile or enigmatic reality, were possible, therefore we are not only dealing with a congenital defect of the metaphysical flight of the first philosopher. The genealogy of philosophical wonder shows the limitations of this *pathos*, its richness and its affinity with valuable forms of knowledge and experience that are not exclusively philosophical. Zambrano and Schopenhauer invite us to cultivate these and to consider that the mediation between forms of knowledge is enrichment. In original wonder there is also an attitude of listening to the world. Zambrano and Schopenhauer dignify, each in their own way, that depth, that experience prior to philosophy, poetry and religion and undertake to reread the history of philosophy from a broader reasoning, which is also cultural. But it is a chimera to aspire to a book of the world or a knowledge that encompasses them all and is the same thing. On the other hand, as long as we are beings who know and speak, it will never be possible for us to simply catch reality and we will always be working and living between interpretations, substitutes. Schopenhauer, the pessimistic philosopher not only faces finitude, but also describes options, one of them being, in this case his own, a new artifice: cultivating a double vision that he presents as intuitive and not exclusive to philosophy and that to which in fact, the common man usually subscribes when he simply observes nature. The philosopher could learn from Satan an *ethic of care and empathy* that he seems to forget when he articulates his concepts. However, it is neither possible nor desirable to remain in the immediacy. The art that brings philosophical reason into play prompts him to be *at the same time* a Sisyphus of concepts, a tireless creator and destroyer trying to understand and orient himself with some efficiency in the world, albeit with a modest and fragile knowledge that, even so, respects its signs of identity. And the philosopher should still face *other questions*: to unravel the nature of intuition and conceptualization and what is to be preserved and why from the radical criticism of which he usually presents himself as a champion. He must also make it clear if he does not harbor any faith in realism, that is, the conviction that, despite everything, philosophical reason does capture reality with rigor and therefore is preferable to literature.

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